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Abstract 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) suggested the mechanism of “unnatural selection,” 
where Japanese banks with impaired capital increase credit to low-quality firms 
because of their motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics. In this study, we 
reexamine this mechanism in terms of the interaction effect in a nonlinear 
specification of bank lending, using data from 1994 to 1999. We rigorously 
demonstrate that their estimation results imply that Japanese banks allocated 
lending from viable firms to unviable ones regardless of the degree of bank 
capitalization.  
 
Keywords: interaction effect, nonlinear specification, probit model, forbearance 
lending 
JEL classification: G01, G21, G28 
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When borrowers become insolvent, a bank may become financially distressed. 
Such a financially distressed bank has incentives to continue to lend to insolvent 
borrowers to conceal its predicament, while hoping that the circumstance of 
insolvent borrowers will improve. This type of bank lending that hopes for a 
revival in the credit status of borrowers is called forbearance lending, 
evergreening lending, or zombie lending. If many banks engage in this type of 
lending, the resulting misallocation of credit to unviable firms that could go 
bankrupt would damage the macroeconomic situation further still (Hoshi, 2006; 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). Hence, this practice has been considered 
to be the source of the prolonged economic stagnation experienced since the 
1990s in Japan. 
The empirical study by Peek and Rosengren (2005) is the most important and 
influential piece of research on the misallocation of bank credit in Japan.1 They 
                                                 
1 Empirical research on forbearance lending in Japan also includes Sekine, Kobayashi, and 
Saita (2003) and Watanabe (2010). Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003) used firm-level 
panel data from 1986 to 1999 and found that highly indebted firms belonging to 
nonmanufacturing industries are more likely to increase their bank borrowings for the 
sample period after 1993 despite their low level of profitability. Watanabe (2010) used bank-
level panel data from 1995 to 2000, demonstrating that banks with large capital losses, 
particularly caused by the regulator’s request in 1997 for the rigorous assessment of 
outstanding bank loans, are more likely to reallocate lending to unhealthy industries with a 
higher concentration of nonperforming loans. In terms of a theoretical framework, Bruche 
and Llobet (2014) provided a precondition for avoiding forbearance lending to low-quality 
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specified forbearance lending in a nonlinear function and used loan-level data 
from 1994 to 1999. They found that Japanese banks’ attempts to avoid the 
realization of losses on their balance sheets (so-called balance sheet cosmetics 
herein) induces the mechanism of “unnatural selection,” in which Japanese banks 
with impaired capital are more likely to provide additional credit to unviable firms. 
In this study, we reassess this mechanism in terms of the interaction effect in a 
nonlinear specification of bank lending. Thus, we rigorously demonstrate that 
Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) estimation results imply that Japanese banks 
allocated lending from viable firms to unviable ones regardless of the degree of 
bank capitalization. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section I discusses the potential 
shortcoming of Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) nonlinear specification of bank 
lending in terms of the interaction effect, Section II reexamines the implication of 
their estimation results, and the final section provides our conclusions. 
Appendices A and B explain how to calculate the interaction effect and its 
standard error for the probit model and for the random probit model, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                     
firms. They suggested that regulators should induce banks to disclose the deterioration of 
their capital condition. 
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I. Specifying Lending to Low-quality Firms by using a Nonlinear Function 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) specified forbearance lending by using a random 
effects probit model with an interaction term consisting of a low-capitalized bank 
indicator and a firm performance variable (i.e., working capital ratio or return on 
assets). They set random effects terms for each firm as firm unobserved 
components. This section briefly explains the potential shortcoming of specifying 
the misallocation of bank credit in such a random effects probit model with an 
interaction term.2    
To illustrate the essence of this econometric problem, following Ai and 
Norton (2003), we use a general functional form 𝐹𝐹(∙) and write the conditional 
expected values of 𝑦𝑦 as a function of the linear index function 𝑣𝑣 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 +
𝛽𝛽12(𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑋𝑋3Β3: 
             𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3] = 𝐹𝐹(𝑣𝑣) = 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽12(𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑋𝑋3Β3).       (1)  
 
Function 𝐹𝐹  could be the logit or probit transformation, the logarithmic or 
                                                 
2 The same problem of the statistical inference of an interaction term in a nonlinear equation 
has also been discussed in political science (e.g., Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey, 2010). 
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exponential transformation, or any other nonlinear function of the linear index 
function 𝑣𝑣. 𝑥𝑥1 and 𝑥𝑥2 denote the continuous variables to be used to construct the 
interaction term 𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2  in nonlinear function 𝐹𝐹 . 𝑋𝑋3  denotes a vector variable 
including other observable control variables. 
In nonlinear equation (1), we can express the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘 (𝑘𝑘 =1 or 2) on the conditional expected value of 𝑦𝑦 as follows:3 
 
             𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3]
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
= 𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹
𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣
 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣
𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘
= (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙)𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣    for  𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑙𝑙.                     (2) 
 
Then, we can write the cross-partial derivative, or the so-called “interaction effect,” 
in the following equation: 
 
   𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3]
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
= 𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1
�
𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹
𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣
(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥1)� = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2 �𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣 (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥2)�                                     = �𝑑𝑑𝐹𝐹
𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣
𝛽𝛽12� + �𝑑𝑑2𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣2 (𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥2)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥1)� .                   (3) 
                                                 
3 To clarify the issue of the nonlinear specifications of bank lending, we assume that 𝑥𝑥1 and 
𝑥𝑥2 are continuous variables. We discuss below the case where one of these two variables is 
an indicator variable, which is the case where Peek and Rosengren (2005) specified 
forbearance lending by using a probit specification. 
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Note that even if the coefficient of the interaction term, β12 , is zero, the 
expression above for the interaction effect, 𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3] 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2⁄ , still has a 
nonzero value. This means that the statistical significance of the interaction effect 
cannot be tested with that of the estimated coefficient of β12. Further, the sign of 
β12 does not necessarily indicate that of the interaction effect.  
In Peek and Rosengren (2005), 𝑦𝑦  corresponds to an indicator variable, LOAN𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡, which has a value of one if loans to firm 𝑖𝑖 by bank 𝑗𝑗 increase from year 
𝑡𝑡 − 1  to year 𝑡𝑡  and zero otherwise. Thus, they performed the probit 
transformation of linear index 𝑣𝑣  in function 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3] = Pr (𝑦𝑦 =1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3) = Φ(𝑣𝑣), where Φ(∙) is the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. 
Variable 𝑥𝑥1 corresponds to a low-capitalized bank indicator REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1, which 
is a (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of one if the bank’s reported risk-based 
capital ratio is less than two percentage points above the bank’s required capital 
ratio at year 𝑡𝑡 − 1  and zero otherwise. Variable 𝑥𝑥2  corresponds to the lagged 
variable of firm 𝑖𝑖’s financial capability, measured by using the working capital 
ratio FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 or its profitability measured as return on assets FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. 
 7 
Vector variable 𝑋𝑋3 includes other lender-side and borrower-side observables. In 
their specification of bank lending, if the interaction effects of REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 ×FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 and REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 × FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 have negative values, it implies that 
low-capitalized banks provide more credit to unviable firms (i.e., those that have 
lower financial health and lower profitability) than non-low-capitalized banks do. 
A potential shortcoming of the approach of Peek and Rosengren (2005) is that 
their analysis with the probit estimation of the bank lending equation was based 
on the estimated coefficients of the bank financial health variable as well as the 
firm performance variables and their interaction terms, but not on the marginal 
effects and interaction effects, as expressed in equations (2) and (3). Their 
estimated coefficients of the bank financial health indicator, REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 , had 
significantly positive values, while those of the firm variables, FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 
and FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, had significantly negative ones. 
More importantly, they showed that the coefficients of the interaction terms, 
β12 , were estimated to be significantly negative, thereby arguing that low-
capitalized banks were more likely to lend credit to low-quality firms; in other 
words, forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks to low-quality firms 
prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan. However, as discussed above, the 
 8 
negative values of the coefficients of the interaction terms do not necessarily 
ensure the existence of forbearance lending in terms of the interaction effects, 
𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3] 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2⁄ . Rather, negative estimates of the interaction effects are 
necessary for the existence of forbearance lending to low-quality firms by low-
capitalized banks, who have window-dressing motives to avoid the realization of 
losses on their balance sheets. In the next section, we thus critically reassess this 
mechanism of unnatural selection by reporting the estimated marginal effects and 
interaction effects obtained with the same probit specification as that in Peek and 
Rosengren (2005). 
II. Critical Evaluation of the Mechanism of Unnatural Selection 
Peek and Rosengren (2005) adopted a random effects probit model to specify 
bank lending. The difficulty in estimating the interaction effect, 
𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1,𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3] 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2⁄ , in a specific nonlinear model with unobserved 
heterogeneity, including the random effects probit model, involves analytically 
expressing the cross-partial derivative incorporating the fixed or random effects 
terms. Peek and Rosengren (2005) did not address this problem. In a nonlinear 
specification of bank lending, without obtaining firm 𝑖𝑖’s random effects 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 , we 
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cannot compute the conditional probability of 𝑦𝑦 = 1 (i.e., LOAN𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 = 1) and thus 
cannot estimate the interaction effect.4 To estimate the interaction effect, we thus 
compute three types of conditional probabilities Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖), each of 
which has different assumptions about the firm random effects, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, as follows: 
 
A1. a prediction conditional on the firm random effects that are set to zeros, 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 0 ; that is, Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 0) = Φ(𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 +
𝛽𝛽12(𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑋𝑋3Β3), 
 
A2. a prediction conditional on the empirical Bayes means of the firm random 
effects 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑟𝑖𝑖 ; that is, Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = ?̂?𝑟𝑖𝑖) = Φ(𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 +
𝛽𝛽12(𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑋𝑋3Β3 + ?̂?𝑟𝑖𝑖), 
 
A3. an unconditional prediction with respect to the firm random effects 
                                                 
4 Another practical issue to overcome when estimating the interaction effect is that we cannot 
simply use the commands equipped in standard econometric software such as LIMDEP and 
STATA. Accordingly, we calculated the marginal effect and standard error of the interaction 
effect by analytically expressing the interaction effect in this nonlinear model. We develop 
our analytical expression of the interaction effect and its standard error for the probit models 
with and without the random effects terms in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
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𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2), which is computed by integrating a conditional prediction 
with respect to the firm random effects over their support; that is, Pr(𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3) = ∫Φ(𝛽𝛽1𝑥𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽12(𝑥𝑥1 × 𝑥𝑥2) + 𝑋𝑋3Β3 +
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖) 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖|𝜎𝜎2)𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, where 𝑔𝑔(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖|𝜎𝜎2) indicates the 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) density function. 
 
As discussed above, Φ(∙)  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. Further, 𝑥𝑥1  is the low-capitalized bank indicator, REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1, and 𝑥𝑥2  is firm performance measured by using the working capital 
ratio, FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 , or return on assets, FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 . Once we find the 
conditional probability by using one of the approaches A1–A3 above, we can 
obtain the interaction effect, expressed in equation (3), in the probit specification 
proposed by Peek and Rosengren (2005) as follows: 
 
Δ𝜕𝜕𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖]
Δ𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
= 𝛥𝛥𝜕𝜕Pr[𝑦𝑦 = 1|𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2,𝑋𝑋3, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖]
Δ𝑥𝑥1𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
= 𝜕𝜕Φ(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
│𝑥𝑥1=1 −
𝜕𝜕Φ(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
│𝑥𝑥1=0                                       = 𝜙𝜙(𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑋𝑋3Β3 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)(𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽12)                                                                                          −𝜙𝜙(𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑋𝑋3Β3 + 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝛽𝛽2,   (4) 
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where 𝜙𝜙(∙) = Φ′(∙)  is the probability density function of the standard normal 
distribution.  
Equation (4) clarifies the essence of the empirical analysis based on the 
interaction terms of the low-capitalized bank indicator and firm performance 
variables. The first term in this equation represents the marginal effect of bank 𝑗𝑗’s 
loans to firm 𝑖𝑖  with respect to firm 𝑖𝑖 ’s profitability (𝑥𝑥2 = FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  or FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1) in the case where bank 𝑗𝑗 is low-capitalized (i.e., 𝑥𝑥1 = REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1). 
The second term indicates the marginal effect in the case where the bank is not 
low-capitalized (i.e., 𝑥𝑥1 = REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 0). This decomposition of the interaction 
effect allows us to rigorously analyze the lending behavior of all banks in Japan 
regardless of their degree of bank capitalization.5 
Let us express the former marginal effect evaluated at a hypothetical value of 
firm performance,  𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇ , as ME𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇)  and the latter 
marginal effect as ME𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇). Then, we obtain a consistent 
                                                 
5 Once we introduce the interaction terms, we cannot derive correct inferences about the 
lending behavior prevailing in the Japanese banking system without comparing the lending 
behavior of non-low-capitalized and low-capitalized banks. Peek and Rosengren (2005) 
obtained negative estimates for a coefficient parameter of firm profitability, thus suggesting 
that Japanese banks lend more credit to low-quality firms through evergreening lending. 
However, their interpretation of these negative estimates is unsuitable for their empirical 
analysis based on the interaction terms. 
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estimator for the average interaction effect evaluated at a hypothetical value of 
firm performance (hereafter, AIE(𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇)) as the sample mean of the interaction 
effect (4): 
 
    AIE(𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇) = 1𝑛𝑛��𝜕𝜕Φ(∙)𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2 │𝑥𝑥1=1,𝑥𝑥2=𝑥𝑥2̇ �𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 −
1
𝑛𝑛
��
𝜕𝜕Φ(∙)
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2
│𝑥𝑥1=0,𝑥𝑥2=𝑥𝑥2̇�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                                = 1
𝑛𝑛
�ME𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                                                                 −  1
𝑛𝑛
�ME𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇�𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡                                              = AME�REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇�                                         − AME�REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇�,                     (5) 
 
where 𝑛𝑛  denotes the number of observations (bank–firm relationships). 6  We 
calculate the standard errors of the average marginal effects by using the delta 
method. For the details of the calculation, see Appendices A and B. 
To reexamine the implication of Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) estimation 
                                                 
6  More strictly, the first and second terms in equation (5) respectively represent the 
counterfactual effects in the hypothetical cases where all banks are low-capitalized and non-
low-capitalized ones; hence, the interaction effect measures the treatment effect of the bank’s 
low capitalization, expressed in REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, as long as the confounding factors that can 
affect bank capitalization are fully controlled for in the bank lending equation by using 𝑋𝑋3. 
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results with the average marginal effects, we start by replicating the estimation 
results from their dataset of AER Final Data.txt, which is available online at the 
journal website. The analysis of the average marginal effects presented below is 
based on the replication of the “Full sample” results reported in Table 5 of Peek 
and Rosengren (2005). The sample period runs from 1994 to 1999, during which 
Japanese banks faced increasing pressure to maintain regulatory capital 
requirements under the Basel I framework. 
Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients of and descriptive statistics for the 
bank’s financial health indicator, 𝑥𝑥1 = REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1, and firm performance variables 
measured by using the working capital ratio, 𝑥𝑥2 = FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, and return on 
assets, 𝑥𝑥2 = FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 . 7  The descriptive statistics for REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  indicate that 
about 70 percent of Japanese banks showed a low degree of capitalization in the 
late 1990s. The estimation results in this table clearly show that we can replicate 
Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) estimation results: REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1  has a significantly 
positive coefficient, while FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  and FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  have significantly 
                                                 
7 Peek and Rosengren (2005) defined the firm’s working capital ratio as FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =100 × (Liquid Asset𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − Current Liability𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)/ Total Asset𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and the firm’s return on assets 
as FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 100 × Operating Profit𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡/Total Asset𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. 
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negative ones. The interaction terms, REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 × FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  and REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 × FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, appear to have significantly negative coefficients.8 
Figures 1 and 2 respectively report the estimated interaction effects and 
marginal effects obtained by using the firm performance variables, FWORKCAP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 and FROA𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1. In each figure, the left-hand side panels show the 
estimated interaction effects, AIE(𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇), while the right-hand side panels show 
the estimated marginal effects for low- and non-low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇) and AME(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 0, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇). Figures A1 to 
A3 are obtained by using approaches A1 to A3 to compute the conditional 
probability in the random effects probit specification, respectively. In each figure, 
the interaction effect and marginal effect are estimated at each hypothetical value 
of firm performance, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇, whose range corresponds to the sample range from 
-120 to 80 for the working capital ratio in Figure 1 and from -25 to 25 for return 
on assets in Figure 2. 
The shaded areas of Figures 1 and 2 also report the histograms of the two firm 
variables to allow us to analyze the allocation of bank credit in association with 
                                                 
8 Our random effects probit regression includes all the other control variables and reproduces 
the same estimation results for these as in Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) regression. For the 
estimation results of the other control variables, see Table 5 in Peek and Rosengren (2005). 
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the actual performance of borrowing firms in the late 1990s. The histograms 
illustrate that few Japanese firms borrowing capital in the late 1990s suffered 
from low financial capability and/or low profitability. Indeed, three-quarters and 
nine-tenths of the distribution of the working capital ratio and return on assets 
show positive values, respectively. 
The estimates reported in A1 to A3 of Figures 1 and 2 appear to be 
qualitatively the same, indicating that the firm random effects, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, do not play a 
substantial role in determining the conditional probability. Note also that the 
estimated interaction effects, AIE(𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇), in Figures 1 and 2 have significantly 
negative values for most of the hypothetical values of the firm working capital 
ratio and return on assets. This finding indicates not only that low-capitalized 
banks were more likely to increase loans to unviable firms than were non-low-
capitalized banks in the study period, as suggested by Peek and Rosengren (2005), 
but also that low-capitalized banks were more likely to decrease loans to viable 
firms than non-low-capitalized banks were (or leave them unchanged). Rather, 
given that most firms borrowing capital performed well in the late 1990s, the 
negative values of the interaction effects imply that the misallocation of credit 
from viable firms to unviable ones prevailed because of low-capitalized banks’ 
 16 
motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics.9 
More importantly, Figures 1 and 2 show that the marginal effects for low- and 
non-low-capitalized banks, AME(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 = 1, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇)and AME(REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 =0, 𝑥𝑥2 = 𝑥𝑥2̇), have significantly negative estimates.10 This finding clearly indicates 
that the misallocation of bank credit from viable firms to unviable ones prevailed 
in the Japanese banking sector in the late 1990s; in other words, Japanese banks 
provided more credit to relatively unviable firms, while decreasing credit to viable 
ones (or keeping it unchanged) regardless of the degree of bank capitalization. 
This lending behavior by capitalized banks is not consistent with the balance sheet 
cosmetics hypothesis. 
III. Conclusion 
The mechanism of unnatural selection suggested by Peek and Rosengren 
                                                 
9 Sasaki (2011) found that lending to more troubled industries with more nonperforming loans 
in the 1990s was less sensitive to a bank’s capital adequacy ratio than lending to less troubled 
industries with fewer nonperforming loans. Given this finding, she pointed out that to 
calculate the risk-weighted assets, Basel I equally weighed all bank loans to firms, regardless 
of whether they are good borrowers; accordingly, low-capitalized Japanese banks decreased 
(increased) credit to viable (unviable) firms to maintain adequate capital ratios by avoiding 
the realization of bankruptcy and nonperforming loans under the Basel I framework. 
10  Although we defined the low-capitalized bank indicator,  REQ2𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−1 , by setting the 
threshold value of bank capital buffers above the minimum requirement to various values less 
than two percentage points, we confirm that the average marginal effects for both low- and 
non-low-capitalized banks have significantly negative estimates. 
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(2005) assumes that forbearance lending by low-capitalized banks to low-quality 
borrowers prevailed during the late 1990s in Japan, particularly driven by banks’ 
motivation to pursue balance sheet cosmetics. In this study, we reevaluated this 
mechanism by focusing on the interaction effect instead of the coefficient 
parameter of the interaction term. More concretely, we discussed a potential 
shortcoming of specifying bank lending by using nonlinear functions, 
demonstrating that their estimation results, which are based on the random effects 
probit model, imply that Japanese banks allocated lending from viable firms to 
unviable ones in the late 1990s regardless of the degree of bank capitalization, 
although low-capitalized banks were still more likely to do so than non-low-
capitalized banks. 
Our finding does not counter the finding of Peek and Rosengren (2005) in that 
we rigorously show that the bank’s balance sheet cosmetics hold for forbearance 
lending by low-capitalized banks; rather, we complement it in that we also 
rigorously demonstrate that the misallocation of bank credit from viable firms to 
unviable ones prevailed in the Japanese banking system in the late 1990s.  Other 
hypotheses to explain why Japanese banks emphasized relationships with 
relatively low-quality firms were explored by Nakashima and Takahashi (2016) 
 18 
and Ogura, Okui, and Saito (2016).11 
 
  
                                                 
11 Nakashima and Takahashi (2016) empirically demonstrated that the long-term contracts in 
Japanese bank–borrower relationships aim to smoothing loan prices intertemporally by 
offsetting short-term losses through long-term rents generated by firms with higher 
uncertainty, as demonstrated by the theoretical literature on relationship banking (Berlin and 
Mester, 1998; Song and Thakor, 2007). Ogura, Okui, and Saito (2016) theoretically and 
empirically demonstrated that Japanese banks kept lending to loss-making firms at an interest 
rate below the prime rate if such firms were located in an influential position in the inter-firm 
supply network. 
 19 
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Table 1: Estimated Coefficients of the Bank Financial Health Variable,  
Firm Performance Variable, and their Interaction Term 
(1994–1999) 
 
 
 
Estimated coefficients 
(standard error) 
Descriptive statistics 
 Our 
estimation 
Peek and 
Rosengren  
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
Min Max 
REQ2 0.0556** 
(0.016) 
0.0582** 
(0.0157) 
0.714 
(0.452) 
0 1 
FWORKCAP -0.0107** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0097** 
(0.0006) 
10.283 
(17.431) 
-133.592 89.354 
FROA -0.0086* 
(0.0040) 
-0.0075** 
(0.0028) 
2.970 
(3.292) 
-27.291 26.193 
REQ2×FWORKCAP -0.0029** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0006) 
- - - 
REQ2×FROA -0.0088* 
(0.0039) 
-0.0095* 
(0.0034) 
- - - 
Number of 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
95,566 
1,215 
Notes: The estimation results are obtained from the random effects probit regression. The regression also 
includes all the other control variables of the full sample model reported in Table 5 of Peek and 
Rosengren (2005). Peek and Rosengren’s (2005) results are obtained from their Table 5. For the 
estimation results, standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 5 percent level; ** significant at 
the 1 percent level.  
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Figure 1: Average Interaction Effects and Average Marginal Effects of FWORKCAP 
A1. The Firm Random Effects are Zero 
 
A2. The Firm Random Effects are the Empirical Bayes Means 
 
A3. The Case of Unconditional Probability 
 
Notes: The dots (left axis) indicate the estimated average effects and the capped spikes indicate their 95% 
confidence intervals. The shaded areas (right axis) report a histogram of the firm performance variable.  
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Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects and Average Interaction Effects of FROA 
A1. The Firm Random Effects are Zero 
 
A2. The Firm Random Effects are the Empirical Bayes Means 
 
A3. The Case of Unconditional Probability 
 
Notes: The dots (left axis) indicate the estimated average effects and the capped spikes indicate their 95% 
confidence intervals. The shaded areas (right axis) report a histogram of the firm performance variable. 
